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Introduction
Since Ellsberg (1961) pioneered the concept of ambiguity aversion, both theorists and experimentalists have taken a keen interest in the concept. Ambiguity aversion is usually studied in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework. Anscombe-Aumann proposed a Monotonicity axiom. Monotonicity prescribes, that if two acts differ only on a single state, then the preference between these two acts is given by the preference between the lotteries that are assigned to that state. The descriptive validity of this axiom is the focus of this paper.
The Monotonicity axiom is widely used in models of ambiguity aversion. Indeed, apart from basic choice theoretic axioms like Transitivity and Continuity, Monotonicity seems to be the most common axiom models of ambiguity aversion satisfy. Within the Anscombe-Aumann framework, models of ambiguity aversion that satisfy Monotonicity include Multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) , Rank-Dependent/Choquet Model (Schmeidler, 1989) , Smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005) , Variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006) , Confidence-function preferences (Chateauneuf and Faro, 2009 ), Vector Expected Utility (Siniscalchi, 2009 ), Uncertainty-averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio, 2011) , MBA-preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi, 2011) , monotone mean-dispersion preferences (Grant and Polak, 2013) , and Hedging preferences (Dean and Ortoleva, forthcoming) . Models that do not satisfy Monotonicity include the Anticipated utility/Recursive model (Segal, 1987) , the related Recursive rank-dependent utility model (Abdellaoui and Zank, 2015) , and (non-monotone) mean-dispersion preferences (Grant and Polak, 2013) .
Experimental work on ambiguity aversion has focused on measuring ambiguity aversion or seeking in different domains (gains, losses), for different likelihoods, and for different sources of ambiguity 1 . But we know of no method to test the Monotonicity axiom, let alone experimental work that actually does so. A study that like ours tries to distinguish between different models of ambiguity aversion is Halevy (2007) , but that study focuses on the association between ambiguity aversion and failure to satisfy the axiom of Reduction of compound lotteries. 2 This paper provides a thought experiment that is a test of Monotonicity. Our thought experiment is an adaptation of the classical Allais paradox. Recall that the Allais paradox is set in a world of purely objective uncertainty, and tests Expected Utility (specifically the von Neumann-Morgenstern Independence axiom). 1 For recent reviews of the experimental literature see Hey (2014) ; Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) 2 Also see Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, and Placido (2015) .
Previous authors 3 have adapted the Allais paradox to a setting of purely subjective uncertainty, where it becomes a test of Subjective Expected Utility. We adapt the Allais paradox to a setting where there are both objective and subjective sources of uncertainty. The so-modified Allais paradox tests Monotonicity, and we call it the Allais Horse Race. The Allais Horse Race serves two roles: first it allows for introspective "testing" of Monotonicity, and second, it paves the way for the actual experimental test of the descriptive validity of Monotonicity.
We conduct an incentivized experiment implementing the Allais Horse Race. A real-world lottery is the source of objective uncertainty, while for subjective uncertainty we use future weather in a foreign city. We find that about half of all participants violate Monotonicity, and overwhelmingly do so in a specific, nonrandom way. The hypothesis that violations are due to random error is easily and robustly rejected by the data. The specific pattern of violations we find mirrors the pattern that has been found in experimental investigations of the Allais paradox. Towards the end of the experiment we confront participants with the original Allais paradox. It turns out that violating Independence strongly predicts violating Monotonicity.
To provide some insight into the empirical correlation between violations of Independence and Monotonicity, theorem 1 establishes that for probabilistically sophisticated decision-makers, Monotonicity and Independence are equivalent. This might explain why decision-makers in general tend to either satisfy both Independence and Monotonicity or violate both. For most decision-makers the axioms, while not equivalent, are probably similar.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the Allais Horse Race thought experiment, gives a formal setting, and provides the conditional equivalence of Monotonicity and Independence. Section 3 describes the design of our actual experiment, and section 4 provides the results. Section 5 concludes.
The Allais Horse Race and Monotonicity

The Allais Horse Race.
3 See MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ; Wu and Gonzalez (1999) , also the discussion in Wakker (2010) , pp. 134f.
1A : $1 Million with certainty.
1B :
Horse 1-11 wins and roulette stops on 1. $1 Million Horse 12-100 wins. $5 Million Horse 1-11 wins and roulette stops on 2-11.
2A : $0
Horse 12-100 wins. $1 Million Horse 1-11 wins.
2B
:
Horse 1-11 wins and roulette stops on 1, or Horse 12-100 wins. $5 Million Horse 1-11 wins and roulette stops on 2-11.
Figure 1. Allais Horse Race
We develop the Allais Horse Race thought experiment to test Monotonicity. The purpose of the thought experiment is twofold: to help intuition of how strong Monotonicity is, and to allow for actual experimental tests. As in the classical Anscombe-Aumann story there is a horse race and a roulette wheel. 100 horses numbered from 1 to 100 are starting. You do not know the probability that a particular horse will win. At the same time as the horses are running, the roulette wheel is spun. The roulette wheel has 11 fields, which are equiprobable and numbered from 1 to 11. As shown in figure 1 the decision-maker is confronted with two choice situations, 1 and 2. In each choice situation she has the choice between two options, A and B. In choice situation 1 an intuitively plausible choice, in line with the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , might be to prefer 1A, which is a million for sure, over 1B, where there is a chance of not winning anything. In choice situation 2 by contrast in both bets there is a danger of winning nothing, thus the chance of winning $5 Million in bet 2B may make that bet more attractive than bet 2A. Such a choice pattern violates Monotonicity (see observation 1 in the next subsection). It will be helpful to have a name for this particular choice pattern, let us call these choices the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern. Compare the Allais Horse Race to the classical Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) , reproduced in figure 2. Recall that in the Allais paradox all uncertainty is ob-IA : $1 Million with certainty.
IB :
Roulette stops on 1. $1 Million Roulette stops on 2-90. jective. Thus in the metaphors of the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the Allais paradox only features a roulette wheel (albeit with more fields), but no horse race. Since the Allais Horse Race and the Allais paradox only differ in the sources of uncertainty, a decision-maker who does not distinguish between objective and subjective uncertainty, i.e. a probabilistically sophisticated one, views them as the same choice situation (for a more formal statement see p. 8). Again let us call the pattern of choosing IA over IB, and IIB over IIA the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern, as it is analogous to the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern in the Allais Horse Race (choosing 1A over 1B, and 2B over 2A). The intuitive paradoxical choice pattern is what has often been found in experimental investigations of the Allais paradox 4 , and constitutes a violation of Independence. The next subsection observes that exhibiting the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern in the Allais Horse Race behavior violates Monotonicity.
Formal setting.
To formally discuss the Monotonicity axiom and its implications, let us introduce an Anscombe-Aumann framework. There are (monetary) prizes ω in an interval [ω, ω] ⊂ R. We denote the space of simple probability distributions over [ω, ω] by P, with generic elements p, q, r, t. A degenerate lottery puts probability 1 on ω in [ω, ω] and is denoted by σ ω . There is a (finite or infinite) set of states S = {..., s, ...}. An act f is a function f : S → P such that for some finite partition (E 1 , ..., E n , ..., E N ) of the state space S, for all n, if s , s in E n then f s = f s . The set of all acts is denoted by L. Generic acts are f, g, h. Given a partition (E 1 , ..., E n , ..., E N ), the act f = [..., f n on E n , ...] gives the lottery f n on event E n . An act that yields the same lottery p in each state is called a constant act, and, slightly abusing notation, is denoted by p when there is no risk of confusion. Given two acts f and g and a common partition, a new act can be generated by taking a convex combination of the lotteries obtained in each event: αf + (1 − α) g, where α in (0, 1). 5 Throughout we assume that objective and subjective uncertainty are resolved simultaneously.
is a preference order on L:
Axiom (Weak order).
is complete, reflexive and transitive. -Aumann(1963) proposed the Monotonicity axiom which they called "monotonicity in prizes". Monotonicity requires that if the lottery that an act assigns to an event is replaced by a preferred lottery, then the new act must be preferred:
Anscombe
Axiom (Monotonicity). For all constant acts p, q: if p q, then for any act f given a partition for f :
Another version of the Monotonicity axiom is often used in the literature: for any acts f, g, if f s g s for all s then f g. Note that under transitivity the two versions are equivalent.
While not the focus of this paper, it is natural to ask what Monotonicity implies for the representation of preferences. Monotonicity, together with three basic choice theoretic axioms (Weak order, Mixture-continuity, and First-order stochastic dominance), ensures that the preference admits a monotone, "statewise separable" representation. That is an act can be evaluated by a two-step procedure: A preference functional evaluates the lottery given in each state. The preference functional could for example be expected utility, rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982) or cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . This yields S numbers which are then aggregated by a monotone function to a single number representing the utility of the act. For a more formal discussion see the appendix. Now we can translate the Allais Horse Race into the formal setting. Define the state space to be S = {1, 2, ..., 100}, and partition it into the events
on E 2 . The following observation tells us which choice patterns are consistent with Monotonicity:
Observation 1. If satisfies Weak order and Monotonicity, then: 1A 1B and 2A 2B, or, 1B 1A and 2B 2A.
The proof, and all other proofs, are in the appendix. Note that Monotonicity rules out the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern.
Equivalence of Independence and Monotonicity under probabilistic
sophistication. As argued previously, for a decision-maker who is probabilistically sophisticated, the Allais paradox and the Allais Horse Race are essentially the same problem. Behind this insight lies a more general principle, which theorem 1 in this subsection develops: for any decision-maker who is probabilistically sophisticated, the Independence and Monotonicity axioms are equivalent. Machina and Schmeidler (1992, 1995) provide an axiomatic justification for probabilistic sophistication. A probabilistically sophisticated decision-makers acts as if she has a unique subjective probability distribution over states, and she treats objective and subjective probabilities interchangeably:
Axiom (Probabilistic sophistication). There exists a non-atomic 6 probability measure µ such that for all acts f with partition (E 1 , ..., E N ):
The above axiom closely follows the Machina-Schmeidler (1995, p.114 ) definition of probabilistic sophistication. 7 The probabilistic sophistication axiom neither implies nor is implied by Independence and Monotonicity. Probabilistic sophistication essentially turns the Allais Horse Race into the Allais paradox. Assuming that the decision-maker views the states as informationally symmetric, she assigns subjective probabilities of µ (E 1 ) = 89 100 and µ (E 2 ) = 11 100 . Then the decision-maker is indifferent between each act in the Allais Horse Race and the corresponding act in the Allais paradox (1A ∼ IA, 1B ∼ IB, 2A ∼ IIA, and 2B ∼ IIB). Before turning to theorem 1, let us state the axioms required:
Axiom (Independence). For all constant acts p, q, and r, and for all α in (0, 1):
Independence applies to objective uncertainty only, thus in the Anscombe-Aumann framework its domain is the set of constant acts. If one specifies as the domain the set of all acts, then one gets a stronger independence axiom, which for clarity we shall refer to as Anscombe-Aumann-Independence (AA-Independence):
Axiom (AA-Independence). For all acts f, g, h, and for all α in (0, 1):
The central insight of the theorem is, that, given probabilistic sophistication, Monotonicity and Independence are equivalent. In addition, given probabilistic sophistication, Independence implies its stronger sibling AA-Independence:
Theorem 1. If satisfies Weak order and Probabilistic sophistication then the following statements are equivalent:
We believe that Monotonicity and Independence are similar, and that even non-probabilistically sophisticated decision-makers will tend to either satisfy or violate both axioms. For probabilistic sophistication the similarity peaks in the form of equivalence.
Incidentally, theorem 1 suggests an alternative axiomatization of subjective expected utility (SEU). As is well-known (see Fishburn, 1970) , substantive axioms that ensure SEU are AA-Independence together with Monotonicity. The theorem suggests that alternatively, if one assumes probabilistic sophistication, then adding Monotonicity (or Independence) also yields SEU.
Experimental Design
To find out to what extent the Monotonicity axiom holds empirically we run an experiment. A second purpose of the experiment is to compare and relate the prevalence of potential violations of Monotonicity to those of Independence. We adapt the sources of uncertainty and prizes of the Allais Horse Race as follows: Rather than a horse race, the source of subjective uncertainty is weather in a foreign city as in Fox and Tversky (1995) . Specifically, we consider the event that tomorrow's high temperature in Mexico City is "unexpectedly high", and its complement "not unexpectedly high". We define "unexpectedly high" as 6°F ahrenheit or more above the current forecast. Participants are told the current forecast and are encouraged to check it on an external website, which shows forecasts and past realizations rounded to integer degrees Fahrenheit. For objective uncertainty we use a real-world lottery, the evening draw of "Texas Pick 3". It produces the numbers between 000 and 999 with equal probability. In the Allais Horse Race we consider the last digit, in the Allais paradox the last two digits. Thus we slightly modify the objective probabilities in the Allais Horse Race (10 instead of 11 equiprobable objective events). This simplifies the objective probabilities for participants, and, in the terminology of Zizzo (2010) , nondeceptively obfuscates the purpose of the experiment to participants as the Allais Horse Race and the Allais paradox become even less similar. For the non-zero prizes, rather than the thought experiment amounts of $1 Million and $5 Million we use $4 and $5. 8 With these modifications and partitioning the state space into the event E = "unexpectedly hot" and its complement E C we get the acts 1A*= σ 4 , 1B* = σ 4 on E C , 0; 1 10 , 5; 9 10 on E , 2A* = σ 0 on E C , σ 4 on E , and 2B* = σ 0 on E C , 0; 1 10 , 5; 9 10 on E . Figure 3 shows, using the example of act 1B*, how the acts are displayed to participants (the temperature symbols are defined and explained to participants). Acts are called "lotteries" throughout the experiment. Note that observation 1 analogously applies to the acts in the experiment. In the case of the Allais paradox, the lotteries in the experiment (IA*, IB*, IIA*, IIB*) differ from the original lotteries (IA, IB, IIA, IIB) only in the prizes as described above. Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). We restricted participation to U.S. workers. The experiment was conducted using the Qualtrics Survey Platform, all subjects completed the study within a few hours on the same day in the second half of 2015. We incentivized participants with a substantial participation fee and prizes: The median hourly reservation wage on AMT is $1.38 9 , the experiment was described as taking 10 to 15 minutes with a participation fee of $0.50, to which in addition prizes from $0 to $5 could be won.
The sequence of the experiment is as follows 10 : participants are informed about the study and voluntary consent is obtained, the acts are explained including links to the external websites of weather.com and Texas Pick 3, followed by three (non-incentivized) understanding questions. As a further test of participants' understanding the subsequent screen offers a choice between two acts, where one act first-order stochastically dominates the other 11 . On this screen, as well as the Allais Horse Race and Allais paradox screens, subjects are given a choice 12 between the acts, which are presented in random order. The next two screens each present an Allais Horse Race choice situation, where the order of the screens (choice situations) is random. This is followed by the two Allais paradox choice situations, which are again displayed in random order. Finally, using the reservation probability method 13 , participants' beliefs about the probability of the event E ("unexpectedly high temperature") are elicited in an incentivized manner. In total participants are asked to make nine choices, and the Random Lottery Incentive (RLI) system is used to make hedging impossible. 14
Experimental Results
Data from N = 552 participants was collected. Table 1 gives participants' choices in the Allais Horse Race. Consider the first row of results which concerns the full sample. Choices in columns two and three do not violate Monotonicity, choices in columns four and five do. The modal choice of participants violates Monotonicity in a particular way: 38.8 percent of participants exhibit the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern (choosing 1A* over 1B* but 2B* over 2A*). Violations of Monotonicity are not random, rather there is an asymmetric pattern, as violations in the opposite way are much rarer with 9.2 percent. Following Conlisk (1989) and the subsequent literature, we test whether violations are the result of random, symmetric participant error. We can reject that hypothesis at all conventional significance levels (Z = 11.06, p-value < 10 −28 ). The remaining 12 We use direct choice rather than willingness-to-pay to avoid the preference reversals arising from loss aversion as discovered by Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker (2011) . 13 The reservation probability method is an adaptation of the BDM-mechanism (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak, 1964) . Its advantage is that it does not require correction for the risk attitude of subjects (Schlag, Tremewan, and van der Weele, 2014) . Besides offering incentives to participants, the reservation probability method has another advantage in an ambiguity aversion context: asking for a single probability estimate need not be a well-defined question for subjects who do not form a single subjective prior, but the questions of the reservation probability method are well-defined even for such subjects. The exact interpretation of the answer then naturally depends on what model of ambiguity attitudes one assumes. A conservative interpretation is to assume the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) , then the elicited belief corresponds to the prior that assigns the lowest probability on the event tomorrow's temperature is "unexpectedly high". 14 Starmer and Sugden (1991) show that the RLI is empirically valid since participants tend to bracket narrowly. rows repeat the analysis but for different subsamples as a first robustness check. The second row of results considers only participants who got both test questions 1 and 2 correct. The third row considers only participants who in addition satisfy (generalized) first-order stochastic dominance. The remaining rows split the sample by duration. These different subsamples can be seen as different ways of restricting attention to subjects who understand the experiment and take it seriously, an issue about which one may be particularly concerned on AMT. The picture that emerges is that the distribution of violations is very similar across subsamples. Table 1 in the appendix (table 5, p.25) finds robustness across further subsamples. A more formal test of robustness is provided by the linear probability model towards the end of this section. 15 Conlisk's test rejects the hypothesis that this violation is due to random, symmetric error (Z= 6.92, p-value < 10 −10 ). Again results are robust across subsamples, table 6 in the appendix (p.26) offers even more robustness checks by subsample yielding the same conclusion. Roughly speaking violations of Independence have similar prevalance as violations of Monotonicity, in both cases about half the subjects violate the axioms, and in both cases the violations display the same asymmetric pattern. for each particular behavior in the Allais paradox the modal choice is the analogous behavior in the Allais Horse Race (except for the last and smallest group, the opposite of the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern). This is striking since the questions are presented screens apart, the order in which the acts and choice situations appear is random, and the questions are substantially different. To investigate the questions of robustness of the results, and predictors of violations of Monotonicity further, table 4 provides a linear probability model 16 . The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value 1 iff a subject exhibits the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern in the Allais Horse Race. In all our specifications exhibiting the intuitive paradoxical choice pattern in the Allais paradox increases the likelihood of exhibiting the analogous pattern in the Allais Horse Race by about 15 percentage points compared to the baseline of choosing IA* and IIA*. That coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications.
Conclusion
Data collected in this paper challenges models of ambiguity aversion that assume Anscombe-Aumann's Monotonicity axiom. About half of all our experimental subjects exhibit behavior at odds with the predictions of such models. The Monotonicity axiom is, apart from basic choice theoretic axioms, the most common assumption in models of ambiguity aversion. Monotonicity says that if the lottery that an act assigns to a particular state is replaced by a preferred lottery then the new act must be preferred to the original one. From the perspective of the representation of preferences, Monotonicity implies that the preference admits a monotone, state-wise separable representation.
This paper introduces the Allais Horse Race, which is a modification of the famous Allais paradox. In the Allais paradox all uncertainty is objective, the modification consists of making some but not all of the uncertainty subjective. Thereby the experiment ceases to be a test of Independence, and instead becomes a test of Monotonicity.
Theorem 1 relates the Monotonicity and Independence axioms, by establishing that for probabilistically sophisticated decision-makers the two axioms are equivalent. We think of Monotonicity as the cousin of Independence in the world of subjective/objective uncertainty. Even decision-makers who are not probabilistically sophisticated probably view the axioms as related. Our experimental evidence confirms this intuition: First, violations of Independence and Monotonicity are of similar prevalence, being exhibited by about one in two participants. Second, violations of Independence and Monotonicity are related, violating Independence is a strong predictor of violating Monotonicity.
The Allais paradox challenged the descriptive accuracy of Independence in a setting of objective uncertainty, leading to the development of new positive theories (e.g. Gul, 1991) which replace Independence by weaker axioms such as Betweenness (see Chew, 1983 and Dekel, 1986) . The Allais Horse Race tests Monotonicity, and the evidence collected on its basis in this paper shows that models that assume Monotonicity are not rich enough to describe modal subject behavior. implies 2A 2B. The proofs of (ii) -(iv) are analogous.
Proof of theorem 1: (iii) trivially implies (ii), thus it suffices to show that (ii) implies (i), and (i) implies (iii). (ii) implies (i): Consider two constant acts [p] , [q] with [p] [q] . We have to show that for any act h
By probabilistic sophistication there exists a probability measure µ such that:
The latter is a constant act that can be seen as a mixture of two constant acts, putting weight µ(E n ) on p and weight 1−µ(E n ) on i =n µ(E i )h i 1−µ(En) . By an analogous argument we have
Now note that by Independence
(i) implies (iii): Consider three acts f, g, h with f g and any α ∈ (0, 1). Consider a common partition (E 1 , ..., E N ). By probabilistic sophistication there exists a non-atomic probability measure µ such that f ∼
First, note that by Monotonicity:
Second, by applying probabilistic sophistication twice we obtain:
Appendix B: Characterizing Models Satisfying Monotonicity
We restrict attention to finite state spaces S = {1, ..., s, ..., S}. The following observation connects the form of the representation with Monotonicity:
Observation 2. If can be represented by V (U • f ), where U : P → R is a preference functional, and V : U (P) S → R is a strictly monotone 17 function, then satisfies Monotonicity.
Proof. For any two constant acts
we have V (U (p), ..., U (p)) ≥ V (U (q), ..., U (q)). As V is strictly monotone:
As V is monotone, for all acts h :
We call representations of the form described in observation 2 monotone and state-wise separable. A state-wise separable representation evaluates an act by first taking a preference functional U of the roulette lottery obtained in each state, and then aggregating across states using a real-valued, monotone function V . The observation raises the question whether the reverse is also true, that is whether Monotonicity guarantees that the preference will admit a monotone, state-wise separable representation. Theorem 2 establishes that Monotonicity together with three basic choice theoretic axioms implies existence of a monotone, state-wise separable representation. The three basic choice theoretic axioms are Weak order, Mixture-continuity, and first-order stochastic dominance as appropriately generalized to the Anscombe-Aumann setting 18 .
Axiom (Mixture-continuity) . For all acts f, g, h: if f g h, then there exists α in (0, 1) such that g ∼ αf + (1 − α) h.
Axiom ( FOSD) . For all acts f, g: if for all states s, f s first-order stochastically dominates g s then f g, with strict preference whenever there is strict dominance in all states.
The three basic choice theoretic axioms ensure existence of a representation:
Lemma 
By Mixture-continuity this set is non-empty, by the strict part of FOSD it has at most one element. Thus we can define W : P S → [0, 1] by W (f ) = A (f ). Second, we show that W represents : For all acts f and g by FOSD:
18 The axiom we give here is a slight weakening of the FOSD-Axiom in Machina and Schmeidler (1995) . 19 Given a convex set C (in P , L, or an Euclidean space), we say that a function φ :
20
We say that a preference functional W over L is strictly monotonic if W (f ) ≥ W (g) whenever for all s f s first-order stochastically dominates g s , with strict inequality if the dominance is strict on all s. Therefore,
Third, W is monotone as satisfies FOSD. Fourth, W is mixture-continuous: Consider two acts f, g with W (g) < W (f ) and
By Mixture-continuity of , there exists α in (0, 1) such that αf
That the representation implies the axioms is trivial.
As the lemma showed the three basic choice theoretic axioms guarantee existence of a representation, adding the Monotonicity axiom makes sure that a monotone and state-wise separable representation exists:
satisfies the axioms Weak order, Mixture-continuity, FOSD and Monotonicity, if and only if there exists a mixture-continuous 21 , strictly monotonic 22 preference functional U : P → R, and a mixture-continuous, strictly monotone function V :
Proof. i) The axioms imply the representation: First we construct U and V . Using the W from lemma 1, we define U : P → [0, 1] by:
and V : [0, 1] S → [0, 1] by:
To show that W represents, we prove that (given Monotonicity) W (f ) and
Observe that it suffices to show that for all acts f :
21 Given a convex set C (in P , L, or an Euclidean space), we say that a function φ :
22
We say that U is strictly monotonic if U (p) ≥ U (q) whenever p first-order stochastically dominates q, with strict inequality in the case of strict dominance. as it implies, by (the strict part of) FOSD, W (f ) = V (U (f 1 ) , ..., U (f S )). By construction of W :
Observe that by definition of U , for all lotteries f s : Finally, by definition of V :
As W is mixture-continuous and strictly monotonic, U is mixture-continuous and strictly monotonic, and V is mixture-continuous and strictly monotone.
(ii) The representation implies the axioms: According to lemma 1, satisfies the axioms Weak order, Mixture-continuity and FOSD. According to observation 2, satisfies Monotonicity.
Note that many models of ambiguity aversion that admit a state-wise separable representation assume expected utility regarding objective uncertainty, i.e. 
